Louisiana Law Review
Volume 51
Number 6 July 1991

Article 6

7-1-1991

Davis v. Henry: One More Piece to the Public Employee Strike
Rights Puzzle
Ricky L. Babin

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev
Part of the Law Commons

Repository Citation
Ricky L. Babin, Davis v. Henry: One More Piece to the Public Employee Strike Rights Puzzle, 51 La. L. Rev.
(1991)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol51/iss6/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

NOTES

Davis v. Henry: One More Piece to the Public Employee
Strike Rights Puzzle
I.

INTRODUCTION

On January 8, 1990, the Supreme Court of Louisiana shed a glimmer
of light upon the present status of public employee labor law in Louisiana. In Davis v. Henry,' Chief Justice Dixon, speaking for the court,
held that the district court had correctly refused to enjoin a three month
old Terrebonne Parish school employees' strike.2 The supreme court
decision resolved in the negative the previously unanswered question of
whether any public employee strike was "per se" illegal and would be
enjoined. The total impact of this decision and how it is to be reconciled
with existing legislation and jurisprudence will be the focus of both
employees and employers in future public labor disputes.
At a minimum, the Davis decision has removed Louisiana state
courts as participants in public labor disputes provided the strike involves
"non-essential" 3 employees. At a maximum, the decision grants public
employees an affirmative, judicially protected right to strike, and certain

Copyright 1991, by LoUtSIINA LAW REVIEW.
1. 555 So. 2d 457 (La. 1990).
2. The court reversed the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal decision of Davis
v. Henry, 555 So. 2d 484 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990). The supreme court held that Louisiana
state courts were without jurisdiction to enjoin the teachers' strike at issue. The court
reasoned that Louisiana's anti-injunction statute, commonly referred to as our "Little
Norris-LaGuardia Act," was applicable to public employee strikes. The Louisiana statute,
La. R.S. 23:821-849 (1985), is modeled after the federal Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 101-115 (1982), and provides in pertinent part:
No court shall issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction
which in specific or general terms prohibits any person or persons from doing,
whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts:
(1) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of
employment regardless of any promise, undertaking, contract or agreement to
do such work or to remain in such employment;
(2) Becoming or remaining a member of any labor organization or of any
employer organization, regardless of any such undertaking or promise ....
La. R.S. 23:841 (1985).
3. 555 So. 2d at 468. The court adopted the "essentiality" test, which provides that
certain employees deemed essential to public safety (for instance, police officers) would
not be able to strike and that such strikes would continue to be enjoined by the courts.
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dicta in the decision4 suggest public employees may have rights akin to
those granted to private employees under federal law.'
This casenote will briefly examine the history of public employee
strikes in Louisiana and elsewhere, and the law in Louisiana prior to
Davis. It will also concentrate on the Davis decision and the rationale
set forth therein. The effects of Davis on public sector strikes and public
employee rights will be discussed, and finally, possible solutions to the
problem of public employee strikes will be explored both within the
confines of the Davis decision and, as the preferred alternative, through
a proposed legislative solution.
II.

A.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Public Employee Unions

Prior to World War II, public employees were often treated better
than their private sector counterparts. Public employees enjoyed comparable wages with greater job security and benefits.6 The balance shifted
in favor of private sector employees after private sector unions were
successful in procuring for their memberships increased wages and benefits. 7 Collective bargaining was instrumental in improving the economic
condition of the private sector work force, and public employees have
long sought a similar system.
The first public employee unions were organized in the 1830's; s
however, it was not until the 1950's and 1960's that public unionization
became a significant force. 9 This increase in public employee union
involvement was a direct result of the disproportionate economic gains

4. 555 So. 2d at 464-65 ("We ... find under our law an intent to afford public
employees a system of organizational rights which parallels that afforded to employees
in the private sector.").
5. The bulk of organizational and collective bargaining rights for private employees
is embodied in federal legislation, primarily the Wagner Act of 1935, as amended by the
Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 and the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959. This legislation comprises
the National Labor Relations Act and is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
6. Shaw & Clark, The Practical Differences Between Public and Private Sector
Collective Bargaining, 19 UCLA L. Rev. 867, 867 (1972); Bernstein, Alternatives to the
Strike in Public Labor Relations, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 459, 460 (1971).
7. Bernstein, supra note 6, at 460.
8. Project: Collective Bargaining and Politics in Public Employment, 19 UCLA L.
Rev. 887, 893 (1972) [hereinafter Project).
9. Id. at 896 ("[Flrom 1956 to. 1968, the proportion of public employees to total
union membership had doubled."); Anderson, The Impact of Public Sector Bargaining,
1973 Wis. L. Rev. 986, 987 (1973) ("Between 1956 and 1968 the percentage of union
members in the public sector more than doubled while union membership in the private
sector increased by only six percent.").
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made by private employees as compared to their public counterparts. 0
Public employees saw their economic position eroded as private sector
wages and benefits surpassed those of the public sector. Likewise, increased recognition of employee unions by federal, state, and local
governments, and the generally more militant attitude toward government
during the 1960's facilitated growth in public employee union membership." Public employee unions continued to grow in the 1970's and
1980's.' 2 Because of large budget deficits at all levels of government
and increasing political pressure for government to provide more services
for less money, public employees are more likely than ever before to
resort to self-help mechanisms to win more favorable benefits. The result
of this adoption by the public sector of the adversarial labor relations
system identified with the private sector has been more public employee

strikes. '3
B.

Legal History

In early American labor law, concerted activity by any group of
employees, public or private, to injure or coerce an employer into
complying with employee demands, was deemed criminal conspiracy and
could also subject the participants to tort liability for interfering with
the employer's business.' 4 These impediments were eventually removed.
The legal bar to employee strikes first began eroding with a slight shift

10. Bernstein, supra note 6, at 460; Shaw & Clark, supra note 6, at 867.
11. Bernstein, supra note 6, at 460; Kheel, Strikes and Public Employment, 67 Mich.
L. Rev. 931 (1969); Project, supra note 8, at 887 (President Kennedy, who received heavy
support from organized labor, signed Executive Order No. 10988, 27 Fed. Reg. 551 (1962),
which provided a limited representative status for employee unions for most federal
employees.).
12. From 1945 to 1984 the national workforce saw a union membership decline of
an annual average of two percent per year; however, during the same period the number
of public employees that became labor union members increased. Congressional Research
Service Report on Implications for Economic Policy and Labor Legislation of Decline in
Union Membership, Daily Labor Report No. 114, June 13, 1986 (In 1960 only 6% of
all union members were public sector employees; by 1984, 29% of all union members
were employees of the government. By 1985, 35.8% of governmental employees were
unionized.).
13. The American labor system, under the National Labor Relations Act, is adversarial
in nature; the act is designed to put management and labor on opposite sides and initiate
bargaining at arm's length to a resolution. The most common manifestation of this
adversarial system is 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) of the Act. That section makes it an unfair
labor practice for employers to interfere with, dominate, or even grant support to employee
unions.
14. See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 41 S. Ct. 172 (1921);
Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896); Hanslowe & Acierno, The Law
and Theory of Strikes by Government Employees, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 1055, 1057 (1982).
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in judicial philosophy, 5 but it was not until federal legislation began
to protect the right to strike that employees were able to engage in
concerted activity free from judicial injunctions and the threat of criminal
and civil sanctions. 6 Private sector labor law was totally revolutionized
by the adoption of the National Labor Relations Act in 1935. '7The act
granted employees the right to choose bargaining agents, the right to
collectively bargain, and the right to engage in certain concerted activity
free from employer disturbance. Yet these developments were of little
avail to public employees.
In United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 8 the United
States Supreme Court held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not encompass federal employees.' 9 Similarly, public employees are specifically
excluded from the National Labor Relations Act.20 These exclusions of
public sector employees show a clear distinction between the rights of
employees in the private and public sectors. Thus, courts have remained
an effective weapon of public employers to stop public employee concerted activity, as public employees are not given the protection to

15. See Duplex Printing Press Co., 254 U.S. at 479, 41 S. Ct. at 181 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting); Vegelahn, 167 Mass. at 104, 44 N.E. at 1079 (Holmes, J., dissenting); it was
in these early cases that two of America's most notable jurists began to question whether
strikes by groups of workers were as wrongful as the courts of the time had labeled
them. Instead, they asserted that strikes were necessary to equalize the positions of
management and labor.
16. The development of the federal legislative protection of employees to organize
and engage in concerted activity against their employer began with the passage of the
Clayton Act in 1914, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (1982). This statute provided that it was not
a violation of U.S. antitrust law for employees to combine or organize. The most significant
strike protection legislation was the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115
(1982). This legislation was the first clear articulation by Congress that public policy
favored employee freedom to join unions and participate in concerted activities to accomplish their goal without interference. Congress accomplished this policy objective in
the Norris-LaGuardia Act by denying federal courts jurisdiction in labor dispute cases.
17. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
18. 330 U.S. 258, 67 S.Ct. 677 (1947).
19. In 1946, pursuant to Executive Order 9728, President Truman directed the Secretary of the Interior to take control of the bituminous coal mines in the U.S. Labor
unrest in the coal industry was thought to be a threat to the national economy during
the fragile time when the country was shifting from a wartime to a peacetime economy.
The Supreme Court in Mine Workers held that pursuant to the Presidential Order, the
U.S. became the coal miners' employer, and as government employees they were not
under the coverage of the anti-injunction statute. The court relied primarily on a statutory
interpretation rule in reaching its holding, stating: "[tihere is an old and well-known rule
that statutes which in general terms divest pre-existing rights or privileges will not be
applied to the sovereign without express words to that effect." 330 U.S. at 272, 67 S.
Ct. at 686.
20. 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1982). Section 2 of the Act provides: 'employer' ... shall
not include the United States . . . or any State or political subdivision thereof ......
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organize or participate in the concerted activity guaranteed to their
private sector counterparts under federal law.
III.
A.

WHAT STATES HAVE DONE

The Common Law Ban

With public employees excluded from the federal labor system, state
governments are free to decide for themselves what collective bargaining
and strike rights their public employees will enjoy. Generally, the common law has regarded public employee strikes as illegal "per se."121 This
"per se" rule is simple and harsh. Any concerted activity against a
public employer to stop government services for the purpose of employee
self gain will be enjoined, and violators are guilty of criminal contempt
of court. Four common arguments have emerged from cases and
commentaryn addressing why public employees should be precluded from
striking.
First, a strike against the government is said to be tantamount to
a denial of governmental authority. Second, the terms of public employment are deemed not to be subject to bilateral collective bargaining
because they are set by the legislative body. Third, since legislative
bodies are responsible for public employment decision making, allowing
strikes would grant public employees excessive bargaining leverage, resulting in a distortion of the political process. Fourth, public employees
provide essential services which, if interrupted by employee strikes, would
endanger the public welfare.
Because of the "per se" rule's harshness, it has been met with
dissension and attack. One of the earliest and most notable challenges
to the common law rule and rationale was Indiana Supreme Court Chief
Justice DeBruler's dissent in Anderson Federation of Teachers v. School
City of Anderson23 . He questioned the "per se" rule, calling the majority
opinion unjustified in holding every public employee strike to be un-

21. See, e.g., Anderson Fed. of Teach. v. School City of Anderson, 252 Ind. 558,
251 N.E.2d 15 (1969); Passiac Tp. Bd. of Ed. v. Ed. Ass'n, 222 N.J. Super. 298, 536
A.2d 1276 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987); School Committee v. Pawtucket Teachers
Alliance, 101 R.I. 243, 221 A.2d 806 (1966); Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Educ. Ass'n,
393 S.E.2d 653 (W. Va. 1990); Annotation, Public Employees-Right to Strike, 37 A.L.R.
3d 1147.
22. See, e.g., County Sani. Dist. v. L.A. County Employ. Ass'n, 38 Cal. 3d 564,
574-75, 214 Cal. Rptr. 424, 430-31, 699 P.2d 835, 841 (1985); Anderson Fed. of Teach.
v. School City of Anderson, 252 Ind. 558, 251 N.E.2d 15, 19-21 (1969) (DeBruler, C.J.,
dissenting); Baird, Strikes Against Government: The California Supreme Court Decision,
7 Gov't Union Rev. 1 (1986); Comment: Right of Public Employees to Strike, 16 De
Paul L. Rev. 151 (1966).
23. 252 Ind. at 564, 251 N.E.2d at 18.
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lawful, regardless of how non-disruptive or peaceful the strike was.
Chief Justice DeBruler thought the teachers' strike at issue in Anderson
was only minimally disruptive because the school system never had to
close. He further believed that, in the interest of equalizing the bargaining
power of both sides of the dispute, minor interruptions and peaceful
strikes should be tolerated.
Similarly, in Timberlane Regional School District v. Timberlane
Regional Education Association,24 the New Hampshire Supreme Court
applied a rationale analogous to Chief Justice DeBruler's, and refused
to enjoin a teachers' strike. At the time of the decision, New Hampshire
was a state that recognized the common law ban on public employee
strikes.25 The court refused, however, to enjoin the strike, primarily
because the school district failed to show it was suffering irreparable
harm, a requirement for the extraordinary remedy of injunction. The
court additionally said that to grant such a remedy to a movant who
had not fulfilled the requirements necessary for injunctive relief would
be "detrimental to the smooth operation of the collective bargaining
process . .. . ,26
In County Sanitation District No. 2 v. L.A. County Employees
Association,2 California judicially abolished the common law rule. The
Louisiana Supreme Court employed the County Sanitation rationale in
Davis. Other states, however, have steadfastly maintained the common
law ban on public employee strikes. Most notably, two recent opinions
rejected attempts to abolish the "per se" ban. In Jefferson County
Board of Education v. Jefferson County Education Association28 and
Martin v. Montezuma-Cortez School District RC-1, 29 the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals and the Colorado Court of Appeals, respectively, rejected the County Sanitation abolition of the common law
strike ban. Both courts reasoned that their states differ from California
because California has a well developed public employee collective bargaining statute.30 In contrast, West Virginia and Colorado do not have
a well developed statutory procedure for handling public employee col-

24. 114 N.H. 245, 317 A.2d 555 (1974).
25. Id. at 248, 317 A.2d at 557 ("New Hampshire is no exception to this rule [of
no public employee strikes], for this court held ... that such strikes are illegal under
the common law of this state.
...
).
26. Id. at 251, 317 A.2d at 558.
27. County Sani. Dist. v. L.A. County Employ. Ass'n, 38 Cal. 3d 564, 214 Cal.
Rptr. 424, 699 P.2d 835 (1985).
28. 393 S.E.2d 653 (W. Va. 1990).
29. Nos. 85CA1553, 85CA1583, 1990 Colo. App. LEXIS 169, 1990 WL 89823 (Co.
Ct. App. 1990).
30. The statute is referred to as the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act and is found in Cal.
Gov't Code §§ 3500-3515 (West 1991).
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lective bargaining matters. The courts then refused to create such a
system jurisprudentially.
B.

Legislative Solutions
Many states have realized that the judiciary is ill suited to develop

a system of public employee labor law.3 The need for stability, peace
in the work force, and some degree of predictability from the viewpoint
of labor and management led many state legislatures to craft mechanisms
to deal with government employees. Two general types of public employee relations statutes have been adopted.
The first type of statute prohibits public employee strikes; however,
the statutes provide some alternative dispute resolution machinery. These
statutes are fashioned after the federal model. Under federal law, federal
employees are unable to participate in strikes against their employer.32
Participation in strikes against the U.S. government will quickly be
enjoined and future participants held in contempt for failing to comply
with the injunction. As an alternative to strikes, the federal statute
provides for and protects employee organizational rights,33 mandates

collective bargaining,3 4 and provides for arbitration.33 The statutes employed by states using this type of employee relations system are customized variations of the federal statute, but each statutorily prohibits
36
public employee strikes.

31. This concern was voiced in Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Educ. Ass'n, 393
S.E.2d 653, 658-59 (W.Va. 1990), when the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
refused to adopt a public labor law system by overruling the common law ban. The court
stated:
We continue to emphasize, as other states have done, that these complex issues
are best resolved in the legislative arena. As we stated almost ten years ago
..."[i]t
was the initial inability of the courts to judicially resolve the competing
interests of private employees and private employers that led to federal legislation
in the labor law field. Most if not all commentators in the labor law area agree
that the complex issues in [the public employees] field are ill suited to any
comprehensive judicial solution."
32. 5 U!S.C. § 7311 (1983) ("An individual may not accept or hold a position in
the Government of the United States .. . if he .. . (3) participates in a strike, or asserts

the right to strike, against the Government of the United States...").
33. 5 U.S.C. § 7102 (1983) (provides that employees shall have the right to "form,
join, or assist any labor organization"); 5 U.S.C. § 7116 (1983) (protects employees from
unfair labor practice of employer interference with employee protected rights).
34. 5 U.S.C. § 7117 (1983) (provides a duty to collectively bargain with employees
where "not inconsistent with any Federal Law or any Government-wide rule or regulation . . .").

35. 5 U.S.C. § 7119 (1983).
36. E.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 19, § 1312 (1985) ("No public employee shall strike
while in the performance of his official duties."); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 839.221 (West 1976)
("No person shall accept or hold any office, commission or employment [who] ...(a)
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The second type of statute legislatively grants public employees the
right to strike. Eleven states (Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Minnesota,
Montana, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Wisconsin) currently have this system. 37 The states that allow public sector strikes do
so with some degree of control. Either by statute or by the courts'
equitable power, strikes are allowed only in some instances. The right
to strike is limited to public employees whose absence from their jobs
would not immediately endanger the public welfare."
Prior to Davis, Louisiana had no public employee relations system.
Louisiana's entire "system" of handling public employee demands consisted of a few broad statutory provisions and inconclusive, inconsistent
case law. Public employees are at the mercy of the states to define their
organizational rights and duties. The Louisiana policy prior to Davis
was "hands off."
IV.
A.

LOUISIANA

LAW PRIOR TO DAVIS

The Right to Collectively Bargain

While Louisiana law prior to Davis allowed collective bargaining in
the public sector, it imposed no affirmative duty on employers to bargain
with their employees. Thus, the decision to collectively bargain was
largely in the hands of employers. Without the right to strike, employees
could not effectively compel employers to bargain. But in spite of the
fact that the law did not grant employees the right to force bargaining,
various statutory provisions and case law seemingly did contemplate
public sector collective bargaining.
Article X, section 1O(A)(3) of the Louisiana Constitution appears
to recognize that some collective bargaining rights are available to employees or, at the least, does not preclude public entities from recognizing
employee collective bargaining groups. 9 The provision's purpose is seem-

participates in any strike"); Ind. Code Ann. § 20-7.5-1-14 (West 1984) (repealed by Laws
1974, C. 74-100, § 7) ("It shall be unlawful for any school employee ... to take part
in or assist in a strike against a school employer ....");Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §
423.202 (West 1978) ("No person holding a position by appointment or employment in
the government of the state of Michigan, or ... political subdivisions thereof ... shall
strike").
37. Davis v. Henry, 555 So. 2d 457, 459 n. 1 (La. 1990).
38. E.g., Or. Rev. Stat. 243.736 (1986). Oregon allows public employee strikes upon
compliance with the mediation procedures mandated; however, under Or. Rev. Stat. 243.736

(1986), strikes by policemen, firemen, and correctional guards are prohibited.
39. La. Const. art. X, § 10(A)(3) is under article X, which deals with civil service
employees, and more specifically under the subsection entitled "Layoffs; Preference Employees."
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ingly to assert that membership in any employee organization should
not be a factor in layoff preferences.4 However, the provision also
states that it "shall not prohibit any state agency, department, or political
subdivision from contracting with an employee organization ... not
inconsistent with this constitution, a civil service law, or a valid rule
This language suggests that collective bargaining
or regulation .... ,,41
is permitted by the article as long as it does not interfere with other
civil service laws, but it does not mandate that public bodies collectively
bargain with their employees.
No statutory provision specifically allows or disallows all public
employees the right to collectively bargain. The right is, however, specifically granted to certain sectors of the public employ. Some public
transportation workers are provided with the right to collectively bargain
under Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:890(D). 42 Similarly, other statutes
tangentially mention or recognize public employee collective bargaining,
but no statute specifically gives that right to all public employees. 43
In the jurisprudence prior to Davis, the Louisiana courts recognized
some collective bargaining rights, or at least did not prevent public
bodies from recognizing collective bargaining representatives. In Zbozen
v. Department of Highways," a group of employees sought to enjoin
the implementation of a collective bargaining contract that the Department of Highways had entered into with several unions representing
about one-third of the Department's employees. The petitioning employees were not members of the unions, had not chosen the unions as
their representatives, and claimed they were not bound by the terms of
the contract. The first circuit agreed that the plaintiff employees were
not bound by the agreement; however, the court recognized that the
agreement was valid as to employees who were represented by the unions.
The court stated: "there is no provision of law that we are aware of

40. See infra text accompanying notes 85-86.
41. La. Const. art. X, § 1O(A)(3).
42. La. R.S. 23:890 (1985). This statute provides in pertinent part:
D. Employees of such public transportation systems ... shall have the right
to self organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing ....
This statute is, however, limited in scope, encompassing only transportation facilities
"hereafter acquire[d] and/or operat[ed]" by municipalities or transportation authorities.
It was promulgated to insure smooth transition of employees from the private to public
sectors when the employees had collective bargaining agreements in place.

43. See, e.g., La. R.S. 33:2213.1 (1989) (provides for police overtime pay with
compensatory time off only in accordance with "[a]pplicable provisions of a collective
bargaining agreement

. .

."); La. R.S. 42:6.1-6.2 (1990) (provides an exception to Louis-

iana's "open meeting" law where executive sessions closed to the public can be held for
"strategy sessions or negotiations with respect to collective bargaining.

44. 293 So. 2d 901 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
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which prohibits governmental agencies from recognizing collective bargaining agents of its employees. In the absence of positive law prohibiting
recognition of such collective bargaining agents for union-member employees, there is no basis for enjoining such action. ' 45
Similarly, in Louisiana Teachers Association v. OrleansParishSchool
Board," a teachers' association sued to enjoin the school board from
holding an election to choose an exclusive bargaining representative. The
court held that the school board could recognize and collectively bargain
with an agent selected by the employees. The court recognized that there
was no positive legislation empowering the board to engage in collective
bargaining, but likewise there was no statutory prohibition against such
action.
Also consistent with statutory law, the Louisiana First Circuit Court
of Appeal stated in dicta in Town of New Roads v. Dukes 7 that "[ilt
would be an impairment of sovereign rights to hold that the State or
its political subdivisions ... submit to collective bargaining with its
employees."" Thus, it is clear that collective bargaining is not mandated
by Louisiana law.
B.

The Right to Strike

The answer to the question of whether Louisiana public employees
had the right to strike was unclear prior to Davis. Unlike the circumstances surrounding the right to collectively bargain, no bright-line rule
emerged. As with collective bargaining, the legislature has been virtually
silent on this matter. Other than Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:890,
which grants transportation workers the right to "engage in other concerted activities, ' 49 no constitutional or statutory provisions specifically
give or deny public employees the right to strike.
The "Little Norris-LaGuardia Act," the anti-injunction statute that
prevents state courts from enjoining concerted acts "growing out of a
labor dispute," was the primary source from which the supreme court
in Davis drew in finding that public employees were afforded the right
to strike.5 0 However, prior interpretation of the statute had not been
so favorable to public sector employees.

45. Id. at 903-04 (emphasis added).
46. 303 So. 2d 564 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
47. 312 So. 2d 890 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
48. Id. at 895.
49. La. R.S. 23:890(D) (1985).
50. La. R.S. 23:821-849 (1985). Louisiana adopted a "Little Norris-LaGuardia Act"
in 1934, patterned after the federal Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-105 (1982).
The purpose of the statute was to give employees "full freedom of association, selforganization, and designation of representatives of [their] own choosing" (La. R.S. 23:822
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The case of Town of New Roads v. Dukes5' addressed the issue of
whether Louisiana's anti-injunction statute was applicable to the state
or its political subdivisions. The court unequivocally answered the question in the negative. In Dukes, the town sued its employees and their
.union representative for injunctive relief to stop alleged illegal acts of
picketing, work stoppages, and acts of violence. Two union supporters
allegedly violated the terms of the lower court's injunction, and the
town sought to cite the supporters for contempt. The defendants wanted
to have the contempt charge tried before a jury, a labor organization
protection device available under the anti-injunction statute. 2 The court
in Dukes rejected the defendants' argument that the anti-injunction
statute was applicable to public employees, and held that the defendants
therefore had no right to a jury trial, and that the injunction issued
by the lower court was proper. 3 The Dukes decision had common law

(1985) to improve their terms and conditions of employment by equalizing their bargaining
power against employers. The act divests state courts of the authority to issue injunctions
to stop labor disputes. It keeps courts "out of the fight" and removes the court injunction
weapon from the employer's arsenal. The statute specifically provides:
No court shall issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction
which in specific or general terms prohibits any person or persons from doing,
whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts:
(1)[cleasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation
of employment ....
La. R.S. 23:841 (1985).
The statute also provides:
No court shall issue a temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving
or growing out of a labor dispute, as herein defined, except ....
La. R.S. 23:844 (1985).
An exception is built into the statute allowing courts to enjoin certain concerted activities.
The statute provides that concerted activity can be enjoined when the following facts are
found: unlawful acts have been threatened or committed, substantial and irreparable harm
will result, greater injury will be inflicted on complainant than on the defendants, complainant has no adequate remedy at law, or that public officers charged with the duty
to protect complainant's property have failed to do so. Even with this exception, courts
are still largely removed from the dispute.
This statute is broad in coverage and includes activities "growing out of a labor dispute."
Id. This includes any controversy between "employers" and "employees" concerning terms
of employment. Id. at § 821. No exceptions are granted to state or local governments
to exempt them from the purview of the statute.
51. 312 So. 2d 890 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
52. La. R.S. 23:848(3) (1985). The anti-injunction statute has a protective device
providing that when a person is charged with contempt of court for violating an injunction
granted under the statutory exception, he or she has certain rights. Among them is the
right to a jury trial, an option not normally available in contempt of court violations.
The provision stems from organized labor's historical distrust of the judicial system, and
allows an accused to be tried by a jury of his peers, rather than (as early labor organizers
believed) a judge that sided with management.
53. The court in Dukes reasoned that although the statutory language of the "Little
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"per se" strike ban overtones. The implication from Dukes was clear,
the legislative silence on whether public employees could strike would
be interpreted pursuant to the common law, rendering strikes by public
employees illegal in Louisiana. Without the limitations of an anti-injunction statute, a court would have much more leeway to stop all or
at least the most effective public employee strikes.
Of course, certain sectors of the public work force have been specifically denied the right to strike. In City of New Orleans v. Police
Association of Louisiana 4 the court held that police strikes were illegal
in Louisiana. The court cited the general common law rule that "in
the absence of a statute governing public employee strikes, public employees have no right to strike or engage in work stoppages," ' , but
qualified its holding by stating that it was not deciding the broader
question of whether all public employees fell under the common law
rule.' 6 The reasoning was obvious: to allow such strikes would so greatly
endanger the public health and welfare that the risk to society outweighed
the police officers' right to strike. The narrow holding of City of New
Orleans offered little help in resolving the larger question of whether
public employees in general are afforded the right to strike. Even in
jurisdictions where public employees do have the right to strike, police,
firefighters, and prison guards are usually not given the right because
7
of the severe risk to the public.
Other pre-Davis cases did not specifically address the right of public
employees to engage in strikes but mentioned it as a side issue. For
example, in Charbonnet v. Geracel s the Louisiana Supreme Court granted
certiorari to decide if air traffic controllers formerly employed by the
Federal Aviation Administration and members of PATCO 9 were preNorris-LaGuardia Act" was broad enough to include governmental employers, it will
instead rely on the reasoning set forth in United States v. United Mine Workers of
America, 330 U.S. 258, 67 S. Ct. 677 (1947). The Dukes court stated that statutes that
divest rights are not applicable to the sovereign unless the text of the statutes clearly so
provides. Additionally, the court relied on the declaration of the policy behind the "Little
Norris-LaGuardia Act" and reasoned that government is not an "employer" within the
meaning of the statute. The policy statement of the statute provides that government has
allowed business to aggregate capital. To equalize that power granted by government,
employee organizations should be allowed the right to organize and aggregate labor. From
this statement, the court reasoned that government is not a contemplated employer since
the "government permitted" language indicates that the statute was intended to apply to
private business.
54. 369 So. 2d 188 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
55. Id. at 188.
56. Id. at 189.
57. E.g., County Sani. Dist. v. L.A. County Employ. Ass'n, 38 Cal. 3d 564, 58587, 214 Cal. Rptr. 424, 438-39, 699 P.2d 835, 849-50 (1985); Or. Rev. Stat. 243.736
(1986).
58. 457 So. 2d 676 (La. 1984).
59. PATCO refers to Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization, a labor union.
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cluded under Louisiana law from receiving unemployment compensation
benefits. The air traffic controllers were denied benefits by the Louisiana
Department of Employment Security for "willful misconduct" in participating in a strike against the federal government. The supreme court
held that the Federal Aviation Administration had failed to prove that
the employees did not reasonably believe they had a right to strike.
Interestingly, however, Justice Lemmon in a footnote stated, "[s]trikes
against state, parochial and municipal governments are not statutorily
prohibited in Louisiana. Indeed, Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:841 arguably provides unqualified protection of the right to strike.''6
In another case which mentioned the right to strike, St. John the
Baptist Parish Association of Educators v. St. John the Baptist Parish
School Board, 61 the primary issue involved an alleged breach of a collective bargaining contract. Several teachers were laid off from their
jobs when they returned to work after a teachers' strike. The employees
alleged the layoffs violated a contract between the employees and the
school board that provided, among other things, that the school board
would not take reprisals against employees who went on strike. The
court held that the "super-seniority status" granted to employees that
did not strike violated the terms of the agreement. Although the case
did not specifically address the legality of the strike, in dicta the court
stated that the employees were "engaged in a lawful strike and work
stoppage against the Board.''62
To summarize, the pre-Davis law on the issue of whether public
employees have the right to strike was, in the absence of legislation, in
the hands of the judiciary. Under the Dukes interpretation of the antiinjunction statute, public sector employees were not included; therefore,
the courts were free to decide each case under their equitable power to
grant or deny injunctions, with the guidance of whatever policy considerations they felt were most important. Certain public safety sensitive
employees (policemen, for example) were specifically prohibited from
striking. This deafening silence by the legislature, coupled with the mixed
signals coming out of the various court decisions, set the stage for the
Louisiana Supreme Court in Davis.
V.

A.

DAVIS

v. HENRY

The Factual Setting

The facts that gave rise to the dispute in Davis began when the
school board of Terrebonne Parish refused to collectively bargain with

60.
61.
62.

457 So. 2d at 678 n.2 (emphasis added).
494 So. 2d 553 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 555.
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its employees over various employee concerns. On October 18, 1989,
only two months into the school year, approximately 750 teachers and
250 members of the support staff went out on strike and began picketing
the Terrebonne Parish School Board's property. The strike lasted longer
than any other in Louisiana history,63 extending eighty-six days until
the employees returned to work on January 3, 1990 after a new collective
bargaining agreement was reached. The school board managed to keep
its schools open; however, the strike caused a drop in attendance from
the normal rate of 94-9607o to 29-63%.64 The school board, in response
to the successful strike, promulgated a resolution providing that no
punitive action would be taken if the employees returned to work immediately.65 The school employees immediately thereafter filed suit seeking to enjoin the board from taking any measures in reprisal. The school
board reconvened, seeking a declaration that the strike was illegal and
a judicial injunction.
The trial court ordered mediation in an attempt to amicably settle
the dispute. The parties remained deadlocked, and the trial court denied
both parties' requests. The court found that, in the absence of any
statutory provision precluding the employees from striking, the strike
was legal. Therefore, the court refused to enjoin the strike. The court
also refused to enjoin the school board from taking punitive actions
against the employees because the school board denied having any intention of firing the employees.
Thereafter, the school board appealed the trial court's refusal to
enjoin the strike to the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal." The
first circuit reversed and held that Louisiana's anti-injunction statute
did not apply to public employees. 6 7 The court did not decide, howevcr,

63. Davis v. Henry, 555 So. 2d 457, 458 (La. 1990).
64. Id. at 458.
65. It should be noted that the school board resolution may have been a tactical
error counterproductive to the school board's end. The letter seemingly had little coercive
effect, and in fact it strengthened employee solidarity. This was suggested in a newsletter
promulgated by the Louisiana Association of Educators that stated:
The School Board brought the issue to the courts in a particularly devious
manner. Three weeks into the strike it adopted a resolution calling for the
replacement of all striking employees. This prompted immediate legal action by
the lawyers for the Terrebonne Association of Educators. Facing an imminent
injunction against the firings, and the threat of personal liability against individual school board members, the board backed down.
.L. Robein, Legally Speaking: State Supreme Court Gives TAE Landmark Legal Victory!,
February 1990 LAE News 7.
66. Davis v. Henry, 555 So. 2d 484 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989).
67. The first circuit was the same court that decided the Dukes case, and it relied
on Dukes and the reasoning therein to conclude that Louisiana's anti-injunction statute
did not include public sector employee strikes. The court reasoned that the state and
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whether the strike was "legal" because the court could issue an injunction
to stop the strike upon a showing of irreparable harm even if the strike
was "legal. ' 68 Due to the lack of any meaningful instruction at parish
schools as a result of the strike, and the monetary losses to the parish
to "make-up" the time, the court felt irreparable injury was occurring
and therefore held the injunction to be proper. Against this background,
the Louisiana Supreme Court faced Davis.
B.

The Supreme Court's Decision
The narrow issue before the supreme court was whether the antiinjunction statute covered public employee strikes. The court held that
the statute was applicable to public employees, and thus state courts
could not interfere with public employee strikes. In dicta, the court also
suggested that public employees may have the same rights as private
employees to collectively bargain and strike. The court stated:
A review of the jurisprudence, statutes and constitution shows
Louisiana public policy favors the organization of and collective
bargaining for both public and private employees. Concomitant
with these protected rights is the right to engage in peaceful
picketing, work stoppage and other concerted activities. 69
This "protected rights" language, while dicta, suggests that the
decision may not be merely limited to application of the anti-injunction
statute or removing courts as a participant of labor disputes. A "protected right" implies a much broader affirmative right to strike and
suggests that concerted activity is protected from employer interference
or reprisal.
Similarly, the court supported this broader reading by stating, "[we]
find under our law an intent to afford public employees a system of
organizational rights which parallels that afforded to employees in the
private sector.' 70 Parallel may mean similar, but substantially less, organizational and strike rights than the private sector; however, the court
leaves open the question of exactly what organizational rights public
employees do have.
C. Analysis
The end sought to be accomplished by the court, that of putting
public employees in an equal bargaining stance with their employers and
political subdivisions were not "employers" within the meaning of the "Little NorrisLaGuardia" statute; therefore, these public entities were not covered by the statute. Also,
the court used the rule articulated in United Mine Workers, stating that statutes that
divest preexisting rights will not be applied to the sovereign.
68. 555 So. 2d at 488.
69. Davis v. Henry, 555 So. 2d 457, 459 (La. 1990) (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 464-65.
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thereby insuring a fair, truly effective collective bargaining system, is
the correct one. Such a result, with checks and balances to insure truly
equal bargaining, should increase the long term productivity of the public
work force to the benefit of all. The reasoning put forth by the court,
however, is not wholly justifiable under current legislation.
The court's analysis of the anti-injunction statute was largely based
on the "clear legislative intent' 17 of the statute to protect the individual
worker's right of organization set forth in the policy statement of the
statute. The court reasoned that the statute was adopted to effectuate
the policy of employee freedom to organize by removing the possible
abuse of the injunctive remedy, which is a recognized hindrance. Therefore the statute, by not specifically excluding public sector employees,
intended to include them. This rationale overlooks several important
points.
First, the language of the anti-injunction statute's policy statement
that the court felt "shows a clear legislative intent to protect all
employees'"7 2 is not so unequivocal. It also contains language to the
effect that the purpose of the statute was to allow employees' concerted
activity only against private employers. As was reasoned in United
Mineworkers and Dukes, the policy statement in the anti-injunction
statute seems to be directed toward private employers rather than toward
government itself. This is illustrated by the language of the statute,
which provides in pertinent part:
Negotiation of terms and conditions of labor should result
from voluntary agreement between employer and employee. Governmental authority has permitted and encouraged employers to
organize in the corporate and other forms of capital control.
In dealing with such employers the individual unorganized worker
is helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect
his freedom of labor . . .73
This language suggests that the employers to whom the statute is
addressed are private employers who have been permitted to organize
capital by the government, not the government itself. This language is
largely copied from the federal Norris-LaGuardia Act;7 4 therefore, it
may be a poor indicator of state legislative intent. But at the same
time, it does not show a "clear legislative intent" to include all employers
within its purview.

71. Id. at 460.
72. Id.
73. La. R.S. 23:822 (1985).
74. See 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1982) ("Whereas under prevailing economic conditions,
developed with the aid of governmental authority for owners of property to organize in
the corporate and other forms of ownership association, the individual unorganized worker
is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract .... ").
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No legislative history is available concerning the intended coverage
of the anti-injunction statute; however, when it was adopted in 1934,
the major concern was not the plight of the public sector. Instead, the
focus of the labor movement was on the concerns facing the industrialized private sector. This circumstance raises doubt as to whether the
statute should reach as far as the public sector.
One point omitted by the court in Davis is that statutory provisions
exist in state law which seem to draw a distinction between the private
and public sector. One such statute is Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:890,
which specifically gives public transportation workers rights similar to
those granted the private sector, including: "the right to self organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection. ' '75 This statute would be unnecessary if all
public employees were afforded these rights. By specifically granting the
right to self organize and engage in concerted activity to a certain group
of public employees, the legislation implies that the remainder of the
public sector is not afforded the same protection. The statute is reconcilable with the omission of public sector employees from the antiinjunction statute if section 890 is read to "protect" concerted activity
from employer reprisals, not just to bar court injunctions as the antiinjunction statute provides. However, the statute would seem to rebut
any "protected rights" language of the Davis court. The statute would
be a redundant restatement of the law if all public employees were
already "protected" to freely engage in concerted activity.
The supreme court in Davis also found support for the application
of the anti-injunction statute and of the protected rights dicta in other
constitutional and statutory provisions, namely Louisiana Constitution
article X, section 10(3) and Louisiana's "Right to Work" law. 76 However,
article X, section 10(A)(3) was misapplied by the supreme court in Davis.
It provides:
No rule, regulation, or practice of the commission, of any agency
or department, or of any official of the state or any political
subdivision shall favor or discriminate against any applicant or
employee because of his membership or non-membership in any
private organization; but this shall not prohibitany state agency,
department, or political subdivision from contracting with an
employee organization with respect to wages, hours, grievances,

75.
76.

La. R.S. 23:890(D) (1985).
La. R.S. 23:981-987 (1985) (Enacted in 1976, the Right to Work law allows all

persons to join or refrain from joining and participating in labor unions.).
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working conditions, or other conditions of employment in a
manner not inconsistent with this constitution, a civil service
7
law, or a valid rule or regulation of a commission.
The court relied on this provision, stating: "with the passage of
this provision, public employees became constitutionally entitled to the
same right to engage in collective bargaining as held by their counterparts
in the private sector.' '78 This reading extends the provision far beyond
its intended scope.
This provision is located in section 10(3) of article X, which deals
with layoffs and, particularly, the preference or order in which employees
are to be laid off when positions are abolished. Reading the nondiscriminatory language with the entire provision limits the non-discrimination clause to the context of preference of layoffs. Membership in
labor organizations is not to be a factor in determining which employees
are laid off when positions are cut. This provision seems only to allow
public employers to recognize collective bargaining, not to require the
government to do so. The language reads "shall not prohibit . . . from
contracting," not "shall contract," as the court's interpretation would
phrase it.
The legislative history of the provision also supports the proposition
that the article is very limited in scope. The provision that became
section 10(3) of article X began as an amendment to the original draft
of article X which was proposed by its proponent "to provide that a
person's affiliations with a private organization-and I'm particularly
thinking here of unions-could not be a reason for favoring or discriminating against [an employee]." 79 The last clause of the provisionl°
was inserted at the request of organized labor, to insure that the "no
discrimination" language did not preclude collective bargaining by rendering an exclusive bargaining agent representing a bargaining unit discriminatory toward members of the bargaining unit not favoring that
exclusive agent."' The clause was only inserted to guarantee that the
non-discrimination language would not prohibit collective bargaining
agreements entirely.8 2 Likewise, nothing in the provision mandates col-

77. La. Const. art. X, § 10(A)(3) (emphasis added).
78. Davis v. Henry, 555 So. 2d 457, 462 (La. 1990).
79. Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Convention Transcripts, vol. IX, p. 2704 (Dec. 12, 1973) [hereinafter Records].
80. "[B]ut this shall not prohibit any state agency, department, or political subdivision
from contracting with an employee organization with respect to wages, hours, grievances,
working conditions, or other conditions of employment .

10(A)(3).
81.
82.

See Records, supra note 79, at 2720-22.
Id.

. . ."

La. Const. art. X, §
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lective bargaining or gives public employees the same collective bargaining
rights as private employees.
Article X, section 10(A)(3) also has its own qualifying provision.
The section permissively allows collective bargaining but only "in a
manner not inconsistent with this constitution, a civil service law, or a
valid rule or regulation of a commission.''83 Given this qualifying statement, section 10(A)(3) has no independent force and grants no constitutionally guaranteed collective bargaining right to anyone, as the right
can be easily abrogated by legislation or administrative regulation. The
language in section 10 is only a statement to insure that the preference
rules in the provision are not read to preclude public bodies from
collectively bargaining with their employees. It surely does not mandate
such an obligation, and any reliance on the article to support it is
misplaced.
The strongest statement in Louisiana law that allows public employees to participate in some organizational activities is Louisiana's
"Right to Work" law." The statute provides: "[ilt is hereby declared
to be the public policy of Louisiana that all persons shall have, and
shall be protected in the exercise of the right, freely and without fear
of penalty or reprisal, to form, join and assist labor organizations or
to refrain from any such activities.""3
The statute employs a broader "all persons" coverage, distinguishable from the "employer" and "employee" language of the anti-injunction statute. The statute seems to grant to all persons the right to
join and assist labor organizations, or to refrain from doing so, without
reprisal from employers, but the statute does nothing to advance to
public employees the right to collectively bargain or engage in strikes.
The legislation and jurisprudence cited by the supreme court in
Davis really adds little in resolving the question of what rights public
employees have against their employer. The central focus in determining
what rights public employees should be afforded, in the absence of
positive law, is public policy. This important factor seemed more implicit
in the Davis decision than explicit, with the court choosing to rely on
vague and inapplicable legislation.
The supreme court in Davis struck down the common law rule and
rationale of not allowing public employee strikes, relying heavily on the
1985 decision of County Sanitation DistrictNo. 2 of Los Angeles County
v. Los Angeles County Employees' Association, 6 the first case where

83. La. Const. art. X, § 10(A)(3).
84. La. R.S. 23:981-987 (1985).
85. La. R.S. 23:981 (1985) (emphasis added).
86. 38 Cal. 3d 564, 214 Cal. Rptr. 424, 699 P.2d 835 (1985). The California Supreme
Court held that the policy reasons for the old "per se" strike ban were no longer valid.
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the common law "per se" strike ban was eliminated by a state court.
The Davis court rejected the common law rule in this case, analogizing
it to tort immunity, which has been abrogated in Louisiana, 7 but the
court avoided the hard questions posed by the various competing interests: should public employees be permitted to strike at all, and if so,
with what restraints? The remainder of this note will focus on these
questions, the effect the Davis decision has on them, and an alternative
solution.
VI.

PUBLIC EMPLOYEE STRIKES: THE CONFLICTING PUBLIC POLICIES

The conflicting policies at issue in determining what organizational
and strike rights should be afforded to public employees are more
complex than those affecting the private sector. The fair treatment of
labor as opposed to management's right to entrepreneurial autonomy
free of interference are not the only issues in a public labor dispute;
the rights and interests of the public are also triggered. Private labor
disputes certainly affect the general population; a strike by the pilots
of a private airline forces people to choose another airline or an alternative form of transportation, perhaps at great hardship. However, many
government services have no market alternatives at all. This lack of
alternatives puts concern for the public welfare into the center of any
public labor controversy. Thus, the public policy inquiry, at a bare
minimum, must balance the rights of public employees to engage in
concerted activity against the rights of the public which depends on the
services those public employees provide. This examination of how the
balance should be struck will begin with a look at the implications of
an employee right to strike.
The right to strike is the ultimate employee weapon in a collective
bargaining system. Absent the right to strike, collective bargaining becomes illusory, with the employer able to unilaterally set the terms of
any agreement. 8 Strikes are the "motive power for agreement"8 9 and
the real means for forcing the desired end, i.e., a labor agreement fair
to both sides. However, strikes are not the only weapon available to

The court said the "per se" ban was a perpetuation of the outdated "King can do no
wrong" theory; not all government services are so "essential" that they cannot be interrupted for brief periods of time. The court added that strikes facilitate collective
bargaining, and that gain in the political process by public union control is no greater
than that recognized by private sector unions. See also Baird, supra note 22.
87. Davis v. Henry, 555 So. 2d 457, 466 (La. 1990).
88. See, e.g., County Sani. Dist. v. L.A. County Employ. Ass'n, 38 Cal. 3d 564,
583, 214 Cal. Rptr. 424, 436-37, 699 P.2d 835, 847-48 (1985); Baird, supra note 22, at
3; Comment, Prohibition Revisited: The Strike Ban in Public Employment, 1969 Wis. L.
Rev. 930, 937 (1969).
89. Comment, supra note 88, at 937.
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employees. Public employees can use the same political process that
their strikes are accused of manipulating to affect their own ends. Public
employee groups certainly have a strong collective political voice. Also,
while very expensive, public employees can urge popular support through
the media and other grass-roots efforts. The employees can also support
and assist candidates who are sympathetic to their cause in political
elections.
While public employees without the right to strike have historically
lagged behind the private sector in wage and benefit growth, this may
be attributable to poor lobbying efforts and the fact that the public
work force is split into many "special interest" groups. A well organized,
massive political lobbying effort may produce better results. From a
practical standpoint, however, strikes are much quicker, cheaper, and
in areas without an adequate substitute work force, more effective.
As a result of employment terms unilaterally set by public employers,
who are forced to stretch limited tax dollars to provide the services
required, public sector employees will logically be paid lower wages and
receive fewer benefits than private sector workers. This may operate to
limit government services over the long term. It is here that the long
and short term interests of society clash.
Over the long term, a collective bargaining contract gained through
the strike threat may increase the benefits package of a local school
system to the point where competition for those jobs increases, thereby
increasing the caliber of the public education work force. The long term
result is a better educational system. However, the short term interests
of society are somewhat anti-strike. Public employee strikes do cause
interruption in services to many people who have no direct means of
solving employee problems. Public employee strikes are sometimes too
effective. For example, while the people of Terrebonne Parish may
benefit as a result of the three month teachers' strike, it was accomplished
at some cost to the school children who were denied an education during
that time period.
Even if employees are denied the right to strike, it is questionable
whether strikes can be stopped from a practical viewpoint. If the penalty
for engaging in strike activity is harsh enough, some deterrence is going
to result, but practically speaking, problems arise when employees use
creative alternatives to strikes to slow government's function and circumvent the ban. For example, "mass resignations" have been used by
disgruntled school teachers. Each teacher personally fills out and delivers
a resignation to his or her respective employerP ° If the resignations are
truly individualized, this action cannot really be termed a "strike," and
even the threat of such mass resignations can coerce employers into
meeting employee demands. While this method runs the risk of being
90.

Comment, supra note 22, at 160-63.
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enjoined if the resignations are not truly individualized, it is sometimes
used to circumvent a no-strike ban.
Likewise, even if strikes are illegal, they will still occur. 9' Some
employees will disregard the illegality of strikes. Simply fining or jailing
participants for contempt of court may not solve the problem but may
cause even more friction, extend the strike, or cause sympathy strikes
by other employees not involved in the present conflict. It also serves
as a method of making martyrs of those punished. 92 As stated by the
California Supreme Court in City and County of San Francisco v.
Cooper,93 "experience has all too frequently demonstrated, however, that
such harsh, automatic sanctions do not prevent strikes but instead are
counterproductive, exacerbating employer-employee friction and prolonging work stoppages.' ' 9 In other words, making illegal something
that is so widely accepted by the public as a reasonable means of gaining
fair treatment has little deterrent effect. 95
Strikes are very difficult to stop; however, anti-strike legislation
would be more effective if a fair alternative to economic warfare is
provided, such as arbitration. For example, if the Terrebonne Parish
School Board would have been required by law to bargain with its
employees, and upon an impasse submit to arbitration, the strike probably would not have occurred. This alternative provides the employee
an interim solution or at least a fair hearing. Their demands receive
immediate attention, and they obtain the time to use more cumbeisome
processes such as political channels to achieve their goals. It is where
no alternatives are provided that law-abiding employees are more likely
to disregard anti-strike legislation.
Finally, prohibiting public employee strikes while the law so strongly
protects private employee strikes promotes an inherent unfairness. In
effect it relegates public employees to a lower status in our society.9
No matter how strong the rationale for the differences in rights afforded
public employees as opposed to the private sector, this unfairness will
always cause some dissension.
The countervailing policies of not allowing public employee strikes
are equally weighty. The supreme court in Davis rejected in wholesale

91. See generally Bernstein, supra note 6, at 462-63.
92. Id.
93. 13 Cal. 3d 898, 120 Cal; Rptr. 707, 534 P.2d 403 (1975).
94. Id. at 917, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 719, 534 P.2d at 415.
95. An analogy may be drawn from the tort and criminal law systems. Tort victims
and victims of crime are provided with a "legal" means to restore the harm done to
them. With legal means available, they are less likely to violate the law and seek reprisal,
even if the recovery or sentence does not meet their expectations. While there are exceptions,
if a just "legal" remedy or a fair hearing is provided, the anti-strike statute is likely to
be more effective.
96. Baird, supra note 22, at 4-6.
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fashion the common law ban on public employee strikes and the policy
reasons behind the rule. The court simply cited article III, section 15(B)
of the Louisiana Constitution which provides: "[n]o system or code of
laws shall be adopted by general reference to it,"' ' and relying on this
language stated: "Louisiana is not a common law jurisdiction, and
common law jurisprudence is not binding in this state.''98 This "reason"
avoids the central issue-whether or not public employees can be given
the right to strike. Two reasons cited by common law courts why public
employees should not be allowed to strike remain valid; those are: 1)
that the right to strike distorts the political process by allowing employees
to reallocate government resources against popular will, and 2) that the
right to strike disrupts essential government services, endangering the
public welfare.
Public employee strikes do alter the political process to some degree.
Public tax money is allocated, and public programs are formed, dissolved, financed, and amended by legislation. When the citizens of a
state want more money allocated to education, more money to public
housing, less to public transportation, and so on, they can choose to
do so through their elected officials, or if he or she refuses, by selecting
another representative who will abide by their preference. By allowing
employees of these various departments to mandate their departments'
budget by their demands, employees distort and alter this process. Their
demands reallocate money possibly against popular will, or necessitate
tax increases which the public may not want to endure.
The government competes for human, natural, and monetary resources along with private industry. A distinction can be drawn, however,
between labor and other resources used by government. Public employee
compensation amounts to over 7001o of state and local budgets;9 thus,
labor cost fluctuation is of the highest concern to these entities. The
effect of market fluctuation of non-labor expenses can be minimized by
the use of long term contracts to stabilize government budgets. Increases
in costs projected over a longer term allows time for the political process
to adjust. For example, if the U.S. military projects its fuel costs will
rise in five years when its current contracts with private industry expire,
the issue can more easily be resolved by the popular vote. Voters can
choose to raise taxes, buy less military fuel, or move resources from
less popular or less important programs. Labor disputes, coupled with
the right to strike, remove that time buffer. Government itself must
make the reallocation choice, possibly against popular will.
From a practical viewpoint, though granting public employees the
right to strike can affect the political process, it does not disrupt the
balance between government and its employees to the point that it distorts

97.
98.
99.

La. Const. art. III, § 15(B).
Davis v. Henry, 555 So. 2d 457, 463 (La. 1990).
Baird, supra note 22, at 16.
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the political process in all cases. For example, if the School Board of
Terrebonne Parish is forced to give in to employee demands because
of a significant strike threat, the result is not unbearable. First of all,
the strike threat used merely to gain the right to collectively bargain
does little to the political process. To meet and simply discuss employee
demands costs the public very little (only a slight increase in administrative expenses), and an indirect decline in the control of all aspects
of the school system. Also, collective bargaining may lead to a net
savings to the public treasury and enhancement of the school system.
For example, teacher bargaining demands may include streamlining of
administrative procedures, implementation of new, more successful teaching methods, and other suggestions that would improve education and
result in a better, more efficient system.
A distortion of the political process would result only in situations
where employee demands were unreasonable, or where monetary benefits
demanded by employees exceeded the resources available. It is in these
instances that government would need to reallocate its resources. This
possibility, even if remote, raises significant concerns about granting
public employees the unfettered right to strike.
The other reason commonly advanced by common law courts why
public employees should not be afforded the right to strike is the
disruption of essential services. This is perhaps the most persuasive reason
to ban public employee strikes. The supreme court in Davis recognized
that all public employees would not be afforded the right to strike
because of the "essentiality" of the services provided: "[w]e do not
suggest in this opinion that the right to strike is unlimited or unqualified."' ' In so doing the court adopted the 'essentiality' analysis"''1
of the California Supreme Court in County Sanitation'°2-acase by case
analysis to determine how essential the service is to the public welfare.' 03
Should the service be deemed "essential" (for example, police or fire
department services), the strike would still be enjoined.
The distinction of essential versus non-essential services, however,
is often oversimplified.0 4 In City of New Orleans v. Police Association

100. Id. at 467.
101. Id.at 468.
102. County Sani. Dist. v. L.A. County Employee Ass'n, 38 Cal. 3d 564, 586-87, 214
Cal. Rptr. 424, 439-40, 699 P.2d 835, 850 (1985).
103. The standard adopted by the California Supreme Court to determine which services
are essential was articulated by the court as follows: "strikes by public employees are
not unlawful at common law unless or until it is clearly demonstrated that such a strike
creates a substantial and imminent threat to the health or safety of the public." Id. at
586, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 439, 699 P.2d at 850.
104. See Anderson Fed. of Teach. v. School City of Anderson, 252 Ind. 588, 569,
251 N.E.2d 15, 21 (1969) (DeBruler, C.J., dissenting); Note, Public Employee Strikes, 21
S.C.L. Rev. 771, 779 (1969).
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of Louisiana,105 the court stated: "[iln respect to their threat to society's
existence, for example, the difference between strikes by police and by
museum employees is obvious."'06 At this level of comparison, the
standard is very easy to apply. However, most services will fall in the
middle of the "essential"/"non-essential" range. For example, are nurses
at public charity hospitals essential or non-essential? Are social welfare
employees, who remove children from abusive parents to protect them
from bodily harm, essential or non-essential? The same problems arise
in relation to the length of the strike. If the Terrebonne Parish teachers'
strike had lasted the entire year, would their services have become
essential? Our society has placed in the hands of our government services
that are essential to some segment of the population, and the courts
are not the place to decide what services can and cannot be disrupted.
If the public decides that a program is important enough to finance
and maintain, the courts should give deference to that decision and
characterize all these services as "essential."
The countervailing policies at issue here are the long term benefits
of allowing public employee strikes. Perhaps some short term inconvenience should be endured to provide for a greater long term good.
However, if an alternative system can be constructed that can accomplish
the long term goals sought without the high costs to society, then that
system should be preferred.
Irreparable harm can result to large segments of the state population
by allowing public sector strikes; therefore, the interim costs should not
be overlooked. For instance, if the public schools in Terrebonne Parish
were forced to close for an entire year, the students affected would be
forced to attend school for an additional year. This would delay the
start of their college education or careers. High school seniors would
not graduate and could lose scholarships. Extended strikes by other
segments of government employees, for example, board of health or
environmental inspection personnel, could cause significant threats to
public health that could not be easily undone, and would far outlast
the temporary inconveniences.
The conflicting public interests that arise in examining whether public
employees should have the right to strike are at the core of a Davistype dispute. The long term societal needs of a stable, competent, and
dedicated public sector work force oppose the short term needs of the
recipients of the services this work force supplies. A system of managing
employee demands must be sensitive to both of these needs. However,
one can fashion a remedy to maximize positive policy considerations

105. 369 So. 2d 188 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
106. Id.at 189-90.
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and minimize those of a negative nature. It is to this end we now turn
our focus.

VII.

THE EFFECTS OF DAVIs

Davis can be interpreted in two ways with differing effects. It can
be read narrowly as merely applying the "Little Norris-LaGuardia Act"
to the public sector, or broadly to create a judicially protected right to

strike. Both readings substantially change prior law; however, the strike
management strategies that each side in a labor dispute will utilize are
different for each reading.
A.

Application of the Anti-Injunction Statute

If the Davis decision is construed narrowly, to merely apply the
"Little Norris-LaGuardia Act" to public employee disputes, this is a
small step in the right direction. In the absence of the legislature granting
any collective bargaining or strike rights to the public employees, the
Davis court's removal of the "per se" ban should give public employees
a weapon to secure the right to collectively bargain. Since collective
bargaining is not the equivalent of employer concessions, but is the only
right to meet, confer, and bargain as a group with the employer, the
only real cost to the taxpaying public is a slight increase in administrative
cost. It seems unlikely, therefore, that collective bargaining by public
employees would violate any public policy concern. Thus, employees
would gain a very effective mechanism to secure for themselves the right
to collectively bargain. 07
Nevertheless, limiting the application of Davis to the anti-injunction
statute leaves open the possibility of various employer self-help mechanisms to defeat any employee strike. The judicial injunction was
certainly one of the cheapest, quickest, and most effective weapons
available to the employer; however, alternatives do exist. First, while
fairly cumbersome in the public employee arena, the employer may
resort to disciplinary action.
Article 10, section 8 of the Louisiana Constitution provides for
removal of "classified" ' 10s civil service employees, providing that "[n]o

107. The court in Davis made it clear that some strikes involving "essential" services
will continue to be enjoined. The balance of interests may tip in favor of employees in
conjunction with marginally "essential" services given the minimal disruption to public
interest.
108. See La. Const. art. X, § 2 (Louisiana state and city civil service is divided into
"classified" and "unclassified" employees; "unclassified" workers include: elected officials, heads of each executive department, city attorneys, registrars of voters, private
secretaries of the presidents of universities and colleges, teaching and professional staffs
employed by schools, colleges and universities and others.).
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person ... shall be subjected to disciplinary action except for cause
expressed in writing."' 9 Similarly, civil service rules provide for the
same type of disciplinary action, providing that an employee can be
removed, suspended, demoted, or have his or her pay reduced for
cause.' 0 Teachers are governed by similar disciplinary rules. Under Louisiana's teacher tenure laws, a permanent teacher"' "shall not be removed
from office except upon written and signed charges of willful neglect
of duty, or incompetency or dishonesty ....11,2 Under these provisions
and similar local provisions, public employers could discipline employees
willfully participating in strikes as being absent without leave, since such
an infraction is "cause" for disciplinary action."'
Practically, however, this employer weapon would be an administrative nightmare. First, if a large number of employees were participating
in the strike, firing those employees would probably not be a viable
option. The cost of finding, interviewing, hiring, and training new
personnel may render this self-help remedy impractical. Only if the
number of employees participating is relatively few will this type of
disciplinary action be a preferable alternative. Secondly, employees who
are terminated are afforded due process rights to appeal their grievances.
For instance, fired teachers have the right under Louisiana law to appear
before the parish school board for a hearing of the offenses.' '4 Likewise,
civil service employees are entitled to a grievance procedure under civil
service regulations for mistreatment, including permanent removal for
cause.' Discharging large numbers of employees may create such a
great administrative backlog that the cost will limit the remedy.
Less severe disciplinary actions are also available to employers. Under
civil service regulations, suspension, reduction of pay, and demotion are
possible alternative disciplinary actions." 6 While these measures may also
lead to administrative appeal problems, the mere ability to threaten such
action may give public bodies some leverage. While administratively
burdensome, with these measures the employer is not faced with the
dual problem of mass administrative appeals or litigation and replacing
an entire workforce. The administrative procedures given to employees

109.
110.
111.
pleting
112.

La. Const. art. 10, § 8 (emphasis added).
La. Civ. Service Rule 12.1, 20.65.
La. R.S. 17:442 (1982) (A teacher becomes "permanent" after successfully coma 3 year probationary period.).
La. R.S. 17:443(A) (1982).

113. See, e.g., Wilson v. Department of Public Works, 528 So. 2d 1060 (La. App.
5th Cir. 1988); Morrell v. Department of Welfare, 266 So. 2d 559 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1972). It should be noted that a court relying on the "protected rights" language of
Davis could define "cause" as not including strikes.
114. La. R.S. 17:443(A) (1982).

115. Part 4 of La. Dep't of Civ. Service State Personnel Manual, pp. 4.1-4.2.
116. La. Civ. Service Rule 12.1, 20.65.
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to appeal disciplinary decisions act as a balancing device in the labor
dispute context. The discharge of employees for participating in strikes
against their employer is a very severe reaction, but with the administrative costs it will impose on the employer, the likelihood of its use
is greatly reduced.
Another self-help remedy that may be available to public employers
is a suit against employees and/or their union representatives for civil
damages proximately caused by the strike. 1 7 Such civil suits are either
brought by the public employer himself, or on occasion by the member
or members of the public injured by the strike. Various legal theories
have been advanced to achieve recovery in these types of actions including
breach of contract,"' intentional interference with contract,1 9 intentional
tort, 20 prima facie tort,' public nuisance' 2 2 and even negotiorum gestio
2
in a common law jurisdiction. 1
The most common type of civil action for damages is a suit by the
public entity employer for injuries sustained in dealing with the strike.
In a Davis-type scenario, if the school board was forced to hire re-

117. For cases involving suits for civil damages against public employees and their
union representative, see Pasadena Unified Sch. Dist. v. Pasadena Federation of Teachers,
72 Cal. App. 3d 100, 140 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1977) (overruled by City and County of San
Francisco v. Local 38, 42 Cal. 3d 810, 230 Cal. Rptr. 856, 726 P.2d 538 (1986)); State
v. Kansas City Firefighters Local 42, 672 S.W.2d 99 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). Compare City
and County of San Francisco v. Local 38, 42 Cal. 3d 810, 230 Cal. Rptr. 856, 826 P.2d
538 (1986); Lamphere Sch. v. Lamphere Fed. of Teachers, 400 Mich. 104, 252 N.W.2d
818 (1977); State Ex. Inf. Danforth v. Kansas City, Etc., 585 S.W.2d 94 (Mo. Ct. App.
1979); Burke & Thomas v. Intern. Organization of Masters, 92 Wash. 2d 762, 600 P.2d
1282 (1979); City of Fairmont v. Retail, Wholesale, Etc., 283 S.E.2d 589 (W.Va. 1980).
118. See, e.g., City of Fairmont v. Retail, Wholesale, Etc., 283 S.E.2d 589, 595 (W.Va.
1980); see also Pasadena Unified Sch. Dist. v. Pasadena Federation of Teachers, 72 Cal.
App. 3d 100, 140 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1977) (overruled by City and County of San Francisco
v. Local 38, 42 Cal. 3d 810, 230 Cal. Rptr. 856, 726 P.2d 538 (1986)).
119. Pasadena Unified Sch. Dist, 72 Cal. App. 3d at 110-11, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 4748.

120. Kansas City FirefightersLocal 42, 672 S.W.2d at 124-25.
121. Burns Jackson Miller, Etc. v. Lindner, 59 N.Y.2d 314, 451 N.E.2d 459, 464
N.Y.S.2d 712 (1983) (suit involved damages allegedly sustained by a law firm resulting
from a public transit workers' strike).
122. See, e.g., Fulenwider v. Firefighters Ass'n Local 1784, 649 S.W.2d 268 (Tenn.
1982).
123. See State Ex. Inf. Danforth v. Kansas City, Etc., 585 S.W.2d 94 (Mo. Ct. App.
1979). Negotiorum gestio is a civil law concept developed from early Roman law. It is
codified in Louisiana in La. Civ. Code arts. 2295-2300 under Chapter 1-Of Quasi
Contracts of Book III of the Louisiana Civil Code. The doctrine, which governs reimbursement for the management of the -affairs of another, was unsuccessfully argued in
Danforth. The court said that in a recovery under common law "quasi contract," an
essential element of such recovery is that the person seeking to recover expected reimbursement for the services rendered, an element lacking in the plaintiff's case. 585 S.W.2d
at 97.
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placement teachers, extend the school year to make up lost days, and
incur additional administrative costs resulting from the strike, these
arguably would all be civil damages. Such lawsuits have been met with
judicial hostility in most cases. Where states have anti-strike legislation,
courts are particularly reluctant to enter into this sensitive area of the
24
law and usually limit recovery to remedies expressed in legislation.'
Also, the remedy has been rejected as prolonging labor unrest, 25 or as
being too effective by tipping the balance of power between employer
26
and employee too far in the employer's favor.'
Cases that do allow recovery are sparse. One such case, Pasadena
Unified School District v. Pasadena Federation of Teachers,'27 later
overruled by the California Supreme Court,2 8 allowed recovery on a
tortious interference with contract theory. The tortious interference with
contract doctrine is not well developed in Louisiana, and is very limited
in scope-so limited that an employee union acting on behalf of its
members would not trigger the cause of action. 2 9
Recovery was also allowed on an intentional tort theory in the case
of State v. Kansas City FirefightersLocal 4230 by the state of Missouri
for expenses incurred by activating the state national guard to cover
striking firemen participating in an illegal work stoppage. The court
carefully pointed out, however, that it was not the strike per se that
triggered recovery; but the employees and their union representative
persuaded other nearby firefighters to refuse to go into the area, and
the striking employees left their equipment in a sabotaged condition.
This prompted the court to find intent on the part of the employees
to injure the city, not just to advance their own cause.'' This decision

124. E.g., Lamphere Sch. v. Lamphere Fed. of Teachers, 400 Mich. 104, 107, 252
N.W.2d 818, 819 (1977) (holding that the Michigan Public Employment Relations Act
was intended to occupy the field, and provides the exclusive remedy).
125. City and County of San Francisco v. Local 38, 42 Cal. 3d 810, 816-17, 230 Cal.
Rptr. 856, 860, 726 P.2d 538, 542 (1986).
126. 400 Mich. at 130, 252 N.W.2d at 830 (school board had -disciplinary remedies
available).
127. 72 Cal. App. 3d 100, 140 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1977).
128. City and County of San Francisco v. Local 38, 42 Cal. 3d 810, 812, 230 Cal.
Rptr. 856, 856-57, 726 P.2d 538, 539 (1986).
129. See 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney, 538 So. 2d 228 (La. 1989). The court
abolished the longstanding ban on the cause of action for intentional interference with
contract. However, the decision limits the cause of action to claims against corporate
officers who intentionally act to the detriment of their principal entities. Id. at 234. Such
a limited doctrine seemingly would have no application to a union seeking to interfere
with the employment contracts of its members, if the interference was aimed at increasing
members' benefits.
130. State v. Kansas City Firefighters Local 42, 672 S.W.2d 99 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
131. Id.at 112, 116.
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may have limited application outside the scope of clearly intolerable
strikes, e.g., those by firefighters and police.
Practically, civil suits for damages are not well suited to many types
of public employee disputes. No mechanism is in place to elect or provide
for sole, exclusive bargaining agents in the public sector in Louisiana.
Public employees often belong to different organizations, each seeking
recognition for its membership.'
Should members of the various organizations strike without a sole, exclusive agent, a difficult causal
connection problem arises. The philosophy of the various representative
organizations vary. For example, the Louisiana Association of Educators
advocates alternatives to strikes to resolve employee disputes.133 It would
be virtually impossible to causally connect a strike by members of the
organization when the organization is not the exclusive agent of the
members of the unit striking and the organization itself is opposed -to
the strike. To say such an organization "intended" to damage the school
board simply because some of its members participated in a strike not
sanctioned by the representative is to strain credulity.
The likelihood of success of any civil suit against a public employee
representative would appear to be low. The remedy has not been rejected
in Louisiana, however, and given the absence of legislation and the factsensitive nature of such a remedy, the cause of action is a viable
alternative for employers.
The public employer may have other extrajudicial methods to coerce
employees back to work in the absence of the injunction. Public employers can always compete with employees for public sentiment. Public
pressure can be a significant force working against employee interests,
should the public seek to amend or reduce already depressed benefits.
Similarly, public employers in certain areas of public service can turn
to privatization. While largely impossible with institutions such as our
educational system, many public services can be turned over to private
companies. Garbage collection, public transit, social work, highway maintenance, and many other government services can be effectively performed by the private sector. This is a viable alternative to rebut
employee demands in the absence of judicial injunctions.
In summary, the elimination of the judicial injunction has placed
public employees and employers on more even ground. A potential strike
is very risky to both sides. The employees risk disciplinary action,
possible tort liability, or the loss of their jobs to privatization. The

132. For example,in a teachers' strike scenario, teachers may belong to the Louisiana
Association of Educators or the Louisiana Federation of Teachers, an A.F.L. - C.I.O.
affiliate. These two organizations are two of the largest, most prominent teacher representative groups in the state.
133. See generally, Collective Bargaining for Us, brochure of LAE-NEA.
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employer risks a failure of services, additional costs of administering
the programs, and self-help remedies that are slow, administratively
burdensome, and politically unattractive. The high stakes on each side
of a potential strike should do much to make strikes a last resort and
facilitate fruitful bargaining.
B.

Protecting the Right to Strike

As stated earlier, the "protected rights" dicta in the Davis decision
suggests that Davis may extend beyond applying the anti-injunction
statute to public labor disputes. Davis could be interpreted to grant
public employees an affirmative right to strike. Courts should refrain
from extending Davis in this manner and judicially creating employee
protections not provided for legislatively because such an extension would
have many adverse effects.
First, protecting the right to strike without countervailing protections
for employers is ill advised. The National Labor Relations Act 3 4 provides
protections to the employer as well as to the employee. For example,
the act regulates picketing,' 35 mandates good faith bargaining on the
part of the union representative, 3 6 provides election mechanisms of the
exclusive bargaining agent,' 37 and grants many other protections. The
system provides protection to both sides to insure fair and quick resolutions to labor unrest. Granting "protections" to only one side would
seemingly be a disincentive for quick resolution and would largely disarm
the employer.
Protecting the right to strike may prohibit employer disciplinary
action and remove the possibility of civil damages. Both of these are
acts of reprisal by employers for employee participation in their protected
right. This protection may also prevent the employer from privatizing
the system, since a job loss caused by protected activity would result. 3 ,

134. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-58 (1982) (employees are granted certain rights of "selforganization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities. .. "
under § 157, and employees' free exercise of these rights are "protected" from interference,
restraint, or coercion by their employers).
135. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4), (7) (1982).
136. Id. at § 158(b)(3).
137. Id.at § 159.
138. In the private sector, employers often subcontract out portions of their work due
to the increased costs stemming from unionization and collective bargaining. The decision
to subcontract, however, must be driven by economic concerns and not motivated by
anti-union animus. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Board v. Adkins Transfer Co.,
226 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1955). If the same rationale was applied to public employers, even
if the right to strike or collectively bargain is protected, that may not prevent public
employers from turning to privatization of public services if economically motivated.
However, it is not clear whether the same rules would be applied to the public sector.
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Employers could still use political or public appeal as bargaining leverage;
however, public employees have for years been very ineffective in bargaining with employers with only political weapons in their arsenal.
Thus, limiting employers to this one inadequate remedy largely disarms
them.
If employee demands were always reasonable, this situation would
not lead to adverse consequences, but the opportunity for abuse is
present. A well organized group could significantly alter the political
process under the judicial protection provided.
A second reason why Davis should not be read to grant an affirmative protected right to strike is because to do so would require judicial
development of a public labor law system. Courts can, through common
law methods, fashion a truly equitable labor system. However, the
inadequacies of such a system are what prompted the enactment of the
National Labor Relations Act and similar legislative systems adopted by
the federal and many state governments to deal with public employees.
Predictability in a labor system is of paramount importance. Employees
are risking their very livelihood by participating in concerted acts. Likewise, employers are risking potential damage claims, back pay awards,
and significant political backlash should they err in handling future
conflicts. Judicial expansion and contraction of rights is very likely and
may hinge on variables which neither side is able to predict. While
limiting the Davis decision to application of the anti-injunction statute
still leaves employees with a considerable risk in certain circumstances
(e.g., where they can be easily replaced), the risk can be measured
beforehand. The risk created by reliance on some malleable, judicially
implied "protected right" is certainly greater.
Louisiana desperately needs a Public Employee Relations Statute to
deal with the issues of public employee collective bargaining and strikes.
Government is under more pressure than ever to squeeze more services
from less tax money. As public employees continue to lose economic
ground, and the likelihood of labor unrest increases, a "hands off"
public labor policy must be reexamined.
VIII.

PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

Most public employee relations statutes are of two types. 3 9 They
are either patterned after the federal statute and do not allow public
employee strikes providing for other means of dispute resolution, or
they specifically allow certain types of employee strikes. However, the
statutes that specifically allow strikes also provide alternative means of

139. Compare Federal Employee Relations Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7101-7135 (1980), with
Alaska's counterpart, Alaska Stat. 23.40.020-23.40.260 (1984).
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dispute resolution in an attempt to avoid public employee strikes. Each
state must customize any proposed public employee relation statute to
comply with its own needs and its own law. Prior commentators have
exhaustively covered this area and provided potential drafts of such
legislation for this state.'40 This section of this note only seeks to provide
generally what an effective public labor relations statute should include.
First, the act should provide public employees with the right and
impose on public employers the duty to collectively bargain. Collective
bargaining puts free market competition into the labor system. It allows
more valuable employees to be paid accordingly; conversely, if government can provide the service more cheaply and effectively by private
contracts, then the employer should be able to refuse employee demands
and seek these more reasonable alternatives.
The act should also provide protection of employee organizational
activities and union membership. The right to join or refuse to join,
to support or not to support employee unions should be specifically
granted to public employees.' 4' Louisiana's Right to Work Statute 42
provides some protection; however, the statute is too ambiguous to
insure such protection to the public sector. While the statute does not
exclude public employees, it also does not clearly include them.
An effective public labor relations statute should also provide exactly
which acts employees are allowed to use as bargaining leverage and
which are prohibited. Whether the statute allows strikes by certain
segments of the public employ and not others or prohibits strikes to
all employees, the statute should forthrightly define what rights are
granted and to whom. A general no-strike clause, similar to the federal
statute, would be preferable. The statute, by mandating collective bargaining, would eliminate the need to strike to force collective bargaining.
Economic strikes should also be prohibited, and some alternative dispute
resolution machinery used. The goal of a successful labor system is to
provide both sides the opportunity to confer, bargain, and preferably
to allow each to make fair concessions to achieve a peaceful, fair result.
Employers and employees reach agreement in a bargaining process by
one of two ways. Either each side grants to the other some concessions,
or the economically strongest party unilaterally dictates the terms. Removal of the right to strike from the employee arsenal does eliminate
the possibility for employees to win an outright economic battle; however,
mandatory arbitration would reach the same result without the need for
disruption of government services if the employee demands are fair and
well founded.

140. See Comment, Public Employee Labor Organization, 21 Loy. L. Rev. 911, 92931 (1971) (cQntains proposed draft of a public employee relations statute for Louisiana).
141. See 5 U.S.C. § 7103 (1980); 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
142. La. R.S. 23:981 (1985).
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Arbitration would also protect employees in certain instances. For
example, if a public employer was seeking to resolve an impasse by
contracting out the work, and such a result was truly beneficial to the
public, arbitration should permit that result. However, if the decision
to privatize is based purely on anti-union motivations, the arbitrator
should not allow such a result.
Arbitration has been criticized, and it is not without some shortcomings. Some areas of employee and employer concern may not be
well suited to arbitration. 43 For example, employers need to retain the
power to make decisions on policy and to implement work procedure
that has been legislatively mandated. However, this criticism seems to
be directed at the quality of the arbitrator, which is not a fatal defect
in the arbitration system. Arbitrators, whether government officials or
private citizens, can refuse jurisdiction over areas crossing into legislative
policymaking or executive administrative areas. Also, some employee
input into the policy decisions of their employers may be positive. For
example, teachers are trained in the most effective way to administer
their teaching methods. School boards, on the other hand, are composed
of elected officials who often have no background in educational practices and methods. Allowing teachers to collectively bargain and then
submit certain areas of professional concern to arbitration, such as
instructional policy and class size, may be very beneficial to the state's
educational system.
The most effective impasse resolution device in the absence of the
right to strike would be a two-tiered system, consisting of mediation
followed by arbitration if the deadlock is not broken.'" This system
should provide that if the parties bargain to an impasse, the parties
themselves can agree on an independent mediator; if they cannot agree,
a mediator will be chosen for them. This first tier allows the parties
to resolve their differences between themselves. If this method yields no
result, the parties are then referred to an independent arbitrator. This
arbitrator would act as a fact finder, and, with all the objective data
he can collect, he would assimilate both parties' offers and make a
recommendation binding on both of them. As an added precaution, the
statute may include appellate review of the arbitrator's decision to an
administrative board, commission, or court. While the possibilities of

143. Kheel, supra note 11, at 938-41.
144. A similar system was briefly adopted in Indiana. See Ind. Code Ann. § 22-6-411 (West 1981) (repealed by Acts 1982, P.L.3, Sec.l). The statute was repealed by the
Indiana legislature after it was held to be unconstitutional. In Ind. Ed. Employment v.
Benton Community Sch., 266 Ind. 491, 365 N.E.2d 752 (1977), the Indiana Supreme
Court held that the public employment relations statute violated Ind. Const. Art. I, §
12, by prohibiting judicial review of administrative determinations of representational
units. The statute was so short lived, however, that its effectiveness is undeterminable.
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the dispute resolution mechanisms are endless, the purpose of the machinery is what is important; the quicker the parties can reach a compromise, the sooner the conflict will end.
In light of the rights guaranteed to employees under the statute,
the legislation should make illegal certain "unfair labor practices" for
both employers and employee organizations. Such practices are prohibited
by the National Labor Relations Act 4 and violations include: interfering
with employees' free exercise of their right to organize and to choose
a representative, refusal to collectively bargain, engaging in discriminatory practices against those who are members of labor organizations,
and engaging in other practices that diminish the employees' rights under
the act. 14 Employee organization violations are largely the same, including: interfering with employees' rights to join or not to join employee
organizations, discrimination, refusal to bargain in good faith, and par47
ticipating in or calling a strike if such a strike is illegal.'
Finally, the statute should provide for administrative machinery to
apply and enforce the law. The federal public employee relations statute
provides for the establishment of the Federal Labor Relations Authority. 14 States have established similar boards or agencies charged with
the duty of carrying out the policies of the act or, to avoid duplication,
have charged already existing personnel boards with the task. 49 Other
states merely have mediation or arbitration commissions. 50 To render
any employee rights granted under a public employee relations act effective, some enforcement commission or board is necessary to expeditiously handle complaints. Otherwise, the violation could only be
enforced in state courts, causing delays that would make the act ineffective. For example, if an employee was fired by a parish school board
for his or her membership in a labor organization, a one or two year
delay in the court system would tend to diminish the act's effectiveness,
since an employee may not be willing to take the chance of union
participation if he faces long term unemployment.
Since Louisiana in its constitution has mostly placed public employee
related matters with its Civil Service Commission,"' any such employee

145. See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982).
146. See 5 U.S.C. § 7116 (1980).
147. See 5 U.S.C. § 7116 (1980).
148. 5 U.S.C. § 7104 (1982).
149. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. 447.205-207 (West 1981 and Supp. 1991) (sets up a
public employees commission, with the duty and power to enforce unfair labor practice
laws and provide mediation support); cf. Alaska Stat. § 23.40.250 (1984) (labor relations
agency synonymous with state personnel board).
150. See, e.g., R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-9.1-8 (1986) (provides for arbitration board for
firefighters).
151. La. Const. art. X, §§ 1, 2, 4, 10, 14, 15.

1306

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 51

relations hearings may have to be done through the Commission to
withstand state constitutional challenge. The Commission seems best
suited for the task anyway, since it is already responsible for administering public employee grievance procedures.
IX.

CONCLUSION

As government deficits mount, taxpayers refuse to bear a heavier
tax burden than the one they already carry. Meanwhile, public pressure
for better education, safer streets, and more social programs increases.
As a result, public employees are likely to continue to decline in economic
status. Thus, there will be more public labor unrest in the future with
employees turning to self-help mechanisms to improve their condition.
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Davis removed the absolute ban
on public sector strikes, but what that means to employees and employers
in the years to come is uncertain. There is still no duty imposed on
public employers to collectively bargain with their employees, but employees do have a mechanism to force such recognition. Without legislative intervention, however, only through future litigation will the
rights and duties of both labor and management be clearly defined.
There is a clear need in Louisiana for a comprehensive legislative system
for handling public employee collective bargaining demands and strikes.
The impact of public labor unrest affects too many people to allow the
judiciary to resolve case-by-case the basic issues of employee rights of
self-organization resolved in the private sector over fifty years ago.
Ricky L. Babin

